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Abstract
People are unable to accurately report on their own eye movements most of the time. Can this be explained as a lack of attention
to the objects we fixate? Here, we elicited eye-movement errors using the classic oculomotor capture paradigm, in which people
tend to look at sudden onsets even when they are irrelevant. In the first experiment, participants were able to report their own
errors on about a quarter of the trials on which they occurred. The aim of the second experiment was to assess what differentiates
errors that are detected from those that are not. Specifically, we estimated the relative influence of two possible factors: how long
the onset distractor was fixated (dwell time), and a measure of how much attention was allocated to the onset distractor. Longer
dwell times were associated with awareness of the error, but the measure of attention was not. The effect of the distractor identity
on target discrimination reaction time was similar whether or not the participant was aware they had fixated the distractor. The
results suggest that both attentional and oculomotor capture can occur in the absence of awareness, and have important impli-
cations for our understanding of the relationship between attention, eye movements, and awareness.
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The visual world is enriched with far more information than
we can possibly process. To successfully interact with our
environment, we must be able to select relevant information.
Attention is what achieves this selection. In this study, we are
specifically interested in spatial attention and its relationship
to the execution of eye movements. Both eye movements and
attention are involved in the process of selectively sampling
information from the visual array for more detailed process-
ing, to the exclusion of other information. The functional sim-
ilarity between them has led to the intuitively appealing hy-
pothesis that covert attention and eye movements exist on a
continuum, with covert attention simply being a subthreshold
eye movement (Klein, 1980; Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, &
Umiltá, 1987). Although a strong version of this hypothesis
has not found wide support (e.g. Smith & Schenk, 2012),
several studies have demonstrated that covert attention tends
to be allocated to the location where an eye movement is about
to be executed (e.g. Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Hoffman &
Subramaniam, 1995; Kowler, Anderson, Dosher, & Blaser,
1995; Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986). Based on these
studies, it is widely believed that it is not possible to move the
eyes without also moving attention.
If eye movements necessarily recruit attention, one might
expect people’s awareness of their own eye movements to be
reasonably high (although, as we will return to in the discus-
sion, the nature of the relationship between attention and
awareness is the subject of intense debate). But awareness of
eye movements is extremely limited. Using a converging
methods approach, we previously measured eye-movement
awareness during three tasks: visual search of a complex illus-
tration, naming objects in a photographic image, and moving
the eyes to a simple, single target (Clarke, Mahon, Irvine, &
Hunt, 2017). Based on the results of all three experiments, we
reached the conclusion that people have many indirect strate-
gies at their disposal to boost accuracy when asked to report
on their own eye movements, but when these strategies are not
available, the accuracy of reports is close to chance. When
alternative strategies are available, people are moderately
above chance in their ability to report on their own eye move-
ments (Foulsham & Kingstone, 2013; Marti, Bayet, &
Dehaene, 2015). Consistent with our conclusions, Võ,
Aizenman, andWolfe (2016) found that people were no better
at remembering where they just looked in a scene relative to a
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baseline of where they think other people would be likely to
look (see also Kok, Võ, Aizenman, & Wolfe, 2017), and peo-
ple make systematic errors in reporting when an eye move-
ment occurred (Hunt & Cavanagh, 2009).
Earlier research on eye-movement errors suggested people
are unaware of these, even when they are quite large.
Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, and Irwin (1998, 1999) investigated
erroneous eye movements executed towards task-irrelevant
sudden onsets. Participants were instructed to move their eyes
to a single orange circle amongst red circle distractors. On half
of the trials, an additional red circle appeared between the
existing circles. Eye movements were directed to this sudden
onset on 30% to 40% of trials, even though it was irrelevant to
the task. The high prevalence of eye movements to the irrele-
vant onset, known as oculomotor capture, has been replicated
many times (e.g. Belopolsky, Kramer, & Theeuwes, 2008;
Born, Kerzel, & Theeuwes, 2011; Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002,
2003; Hunt, Olk, Mühlenen, & Kingstone, 2004; Hunt,
Mühlenen, & Kingstone, 2007; Wu & Remington, 2003). At
the end of their experiment, Theeuwes et al. (1998) informally
asked participants if the sudden onset affected their eye-
movement behaviour. Most participants reported being un-
aware of the abrupt onset, and no participants reported that
their eye movements were affected or captured by it.
Extending this further, Belopolsky et al. (2008) used a similar
task, but after each trial, participants were asked if they looked
directly at the target. People were able to report errors around
two-thirds of the time. Although the results of these two studies
are somewhat at odds (i.e. are participants unaware of all errors,
or just some of them?) they do reinforce the conclusion that
people have limited awareness of their own eye movements,
even when they know that they will be asked to report on them,
and evenwhen thesemovements are large errors that negatively
impact their performance.
Abrupt onsets and salient events tend to capture not only
our eyes (e.g. Theeuwes et al., 1998, 1999) but also our atten-
tion (e.g. Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Theeuwes, 1994, 1995;
Yantis & Jonides, 1984). The oculomotor capture paradigm
grew from a previous paradigm developed by Theeuwes
(1991, 1992, 1994), commonly referred to as the ‘irrelevant
singleton’ (Yantis & Egeth, 1999) or ‘additional singleton’
paradigm (e.g. Simons, 2000). Similar to the oculomotor de-
sign, an irrelevant distractor singleton is shownwith a relevant
target singleton. To the extent that the distractor has captured
the participant’s attention, they should produce slower reac-
tion times towards the target singleton compared with no
distractor trials, and this is indeed the case (Theeuwes, 1991,
1992, 1994; Theeuwes & Godijn, 2001). The conclusion that
attention is reflexively drawn to the irrelevant singleton was
reinforced by Theeuwes (1996) and Theeuwes, Atchley, and
Kramer (2000), who manipulated the congruency of charac-
ters presented within the distractor and target singletons.
Reaction times to identify the character in the target were
slower (by about 20–30 ms) when the character inside the
distractor was incongruent than when it was congruent, sug-
gesting that spatial attention had been allocated to the
distractor on at least some of the trials.
Coming back to oculomotor capture, why are participants
aware of their eye-movement errors on some trials but not
others? At least two factors may be important. First, awareness
could simply be a function of the dwell time on the distractor:
that is, the longer the participant fixates the distractor, the more
likely they are to notice/report having fixated it. Increased dwell
time on an erroneously fixated stimulus was related to increases
in error awareness in studies by both Mokler and Fischer (1999)
and Belopolsky et al. (2008). However, in these studies the dis-
tributions of dwell times overlap, with many unreported errors
having longer dwell times than reported errors. Moreover, it is
not possible to determine the causal direction of this effect: were
participants aware they were making an error because they fix-
ated the distractor for longer? Or did participants fixate the
distractor for longer because they were aware they were making
an error?
The second potentially important determinant of eye-
movement error awareness could be attention. It has previous-
ly been asserted that attention necessarily precedes all eye
movements. If this is the case, attention should precede erro-
neous eye movements to the same extent as goal-directed eye
movements. Whether or not the participant reports awareness
of the error on a particular trial should have no relationship to
the extent to which attention was allocated to the distractor (as
measured by congruency effects). However, some studies
have suggested eye movements can be executed in the ab-
sence of attention (e.g. Stelmach, Campsall, & Herdman,
1997; Van der Stigchel & De Vries, 2015). An error might
go undetected on trials where the eyes, but not attention, went
to the onset. In this case, awareness of an error may be related
to the extent to which attention was allocated to the distractor.
To try and answer the question of what determines aware-
ness of an error, we used a version of the oculomotor capture
paradigm (Theeuwes et al., 1998) that would produce a large
number of eye-movement errors by increasing the target/
distractor colour similarity (see Hunt, von Mühlenen, et al.,
2007). In Experiment 1 we simply asked participants to report,
after each trial, whether or not the eye movement they made
on that trial was ‘good’, meaning it went directly from the
central fixation to the target. The purpose of this experiment
was to confirm that we would obtain eye-movement errors
using our setup, and to estimate the extent to which people
are aware of these errors. In the second experiment, we repeat-
ed Experiment 1, but now asked participants to make a speed-
ed response to the orientation of a C presented inside the
colour singleton target. We also presented an irrelevant C in-
side the onset distractor. We selected for analysis only those
trials on which participants first fixated the sudden onset
distractor, and then made a corrective saccade to the target.
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To the extent that attention is allocated to the onset distractor,
the direction of the C inside the onset should influence re-
sponses (accuracy and reaction time) to the C inside the target.
We can relate the size of this interference effect, as well as
dwell time on the onset, to awareness of the error. If undetect-
ed errors are due to a lack of attention to the onset, we should
see larger interference effects when errors are detected relative
to when they are not.
Experiment 1: Oculomotor capture
Participants in the original oculomotor capture experiments
(Theeuwes et al., 1998) were reported to have been unaware of
their eyes persistently being misdirected towards irrelevant sud-
den onsets. This conclusion was based on subjective reports
collected from simply asking participants during debriefing if
they were aware of their errors during the experiment. Later,
Belopolsky et al. (2008) conducted an oculomotor capture exper-
iment in which they asked participants if they looked directly to
the target after each trial and found theywere in fact able to report
errors on around two-thirds of trials, contradicting the original
conclusion. However, capture rates were quite low (~16%) com-
pared with the original study (~40%), so it is possible that a rarer
capture event is more noticeable. In Experiment 1 of the current
study, we therefore sought to clarify the extent to which partici-
pants are aware of the accuracy of their own eye movements in
an oculomotor capture experiment.
Given that participants are required to provide binary re-
sponses about whether their eye movement was ‘good’, a
simple accuracy measure, such as percentage correct, is not
suitable for characterising performance. This is because the
number of correct eye movements executed will differ be-
tween participants. Each participant will also have their own
particular response bias (e.g. to usually say the eye movement
was good). We will therefore present our results using two
statistics commonly used in the classification literature: preci-
sion and recall. If we are trying to classify ‘error’ saccades
from ‘good’ saccades, then the definitions are as follows:
& Accuracy: the proportion of all items successfully
classified.
& Precision: the proportion of trials classified as ‘not good’
that did in fact contain saccade errors.
& Recall: the proportion of trials with saccade errors that are
accurately classified as ‘not good’.
We conducted the experiment with a group of naïve partic-
ipants. We attempted to disguise the real purpose of the study
by telling participants that we were asking them to report on
their accuracy so that we could remove error trials from the
data. However, to determine whether awareness of the pur-
pose of the experiment mattered for performance and
awareness, we also tested two of the authors in the same ex-
periment to see if their results would differ from the naïve
participants. To foreshadow, the authors’ data looked similar
to naïve participants’ data both in terms of the proportion of
trials on which oculomotor capture occurred, as well as the
reported awareness of that capture.
Method
Participants
Ten naïve participants (five females, Mage = 22.5 years, range:
19–27 years) took part in Experiment 1. Two authors of the
current article also participated. All participants were members
of the academic community at the University of Aberdeen. The
experiment was conducted with the signed consent of each par-
ticipant, and the protocol was approved by the Psychology
Research Ethics Committee at the University of Aberdeen. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Naïve par-
ticipants were remunerated £5 for their time.
Stimuli and procedure
Experimental scripts were created and run using MATLAB
with the PsychToolBox (Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli 2007),
and run on a PowerMac 10.8.2. All materials are publicly
available on the Open Science framework (https://osf.io/
an8gj/). Stimuli were presented on a Sony Trimaster EL
OLED computer screen, 1920 × 1080 pixels. Participants’
heads were stabilized in a chin rest at a viewing distance of
57 cm. Participant responses were recorded using an Apple
keyboard. Eye movements were monitored using an EyeLink
1000 (Ottawa, Canada) in the desktop configuration. The
stimuli and procedure can be seen in Fig. 1.
Each trial began with a central fixation point on a blank grey
screen (HSV coordinates = [0, 0, 0.3], luminance 70.9 cd/m2).
Participants were required to press spacebar to complete calibra-
tion and to begin the trial. Stimuli consisted of six orange circles
(radius 0.9°, HSV coordinates = [0.1, 0.5, 0.8], luminance 127.3
cd/m2) evenly distributed in a (invisible) circle around a central
fixationcross,witha radiusof7.2° (seeFig.1).After1,000ms,all
but one of the circles changed colour from orange to red (HSV
coordinates= [0.05, 0.5, 0.8], luminance117.7 cd/m2).The target
circle was defined as the one circle that maintained the original
orange colour. A discrimination target (DT), presented as a for-
wards or backwards C, appeared inside the target circle.
Participants were instructed to look directly and as quickly as
possible to the target circle. On half of trials an additional red
distracter circle would appear, simultaneously with the colour
change (see Fig. 1). The distractor circle appeared in-between
two existing circles, resulting in six possible distractor locations.
The distractor circle was presented at all possible locations
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equally. Distractor-present and distractor-absent trials were pre-
sentedinrandomorder.Thetargetarraywasdisplayedfor800ms.
During the experiment, after each trial, participants were
asked, via a message displayed on the computer screen (i.e.
‘Was this a good trial?’). Participants responded by pressing a y
for yes or an n for no on the keyboard. Before the experiment
began, participants were told that the experimenters were inter-
ested in filtering out trials in which they made eye-movement
errors. Theywere instructed that a yes responsemeant that during
the previous trial their eyes went from the centre of the display
directly to the orange circle target, a no responsemeant their eyes
did notmove directly to the target circle. If participants responded
yes, they were then presented with a second question: to identify
if the target C, which was presented within the target circle, was
facing either forwards or backwards, by typing f for forwards or b
for backwards. When classifying the landing position of sac-
cades, as long the saccade landedwithin 2.8° of one of the circles,
we assigned it to the closest circle.
There were six potential target locations and six potential
distracter locations, so with three replications, this gave 108
trials. We included an equal number of trials with no sudden
onset distracter to give a total of 216 trials.
Results
Each participant correctly identified the C orientation on at least
95% of the trials. Participants were considerably less accurate in
identifying the trials in which theymade a ‘good’ eyemovement.
To analyse this, we categorised the distracter trials based on the
total path length of the saccades made by the participant during
the trial. Path length was normalised so that one unit represents
the distance from the central fixation cross to the centre of the
target. We then classed trials in which the total path length was
between 1 − a and 1 + a as ‘good’ (a = 0.2 unit). It is important to
note that an eye-movement error using this classification method
does not necessarilymean that the participant looked at the onset;
it only means they did not look directly at the target. The number
of ‘capture’ errors versus indirect eye movements that did not
land on the onset are shown in Table 1. Saccade latency (i.e. the
interval from the colour change to when the eyes startedmoving)
is also shown in Table 1, for completeness. As has been shown in
many previous studies, latency is slower when the eyes are cor-
rectly directed to the target.
Figure 21 shows the number of distractor-present trials that
were classified as good (direct) and bad (error) for each partic-
ipant, and, within each of these categories, the number of trials
to which the participant responded ‘yes’ (it was good) or ‘no’ (it
was not). Data from the two authors are presented as A and B.
It is clear from Fig. 2 that participants varied a great deal in
terms of both the accuracy of their eye movements and by how
1 Note that this figure differs from the version in the preregistered report of this
study. The preregistered version included trials with no onset distractor, and in
revisiting the results we decided the version with only onset present trials was
more comparable to preexisting literature.
Fig. 1 Example of an onset-present trial. Six orange circles are presented
in a circular array around a central fixation cross (first panel). After 1,000
ms, five circles change to red, and one remains orange (second panel).
Participants must saccade to the orange target and report the direction of
the C inside. As this is an onset-present trial, an additional red circle
appears at the same time as the colour change. After 800 ms, the trial
terminates and participants are asked, ‘Was this a good trial?’.
Responding ‘Yes’ means that the participant believed their eyes went
directly to the orange circle on that trial; responding ‘No’means that they
believed their eyes did not go directly to the orange circle on that trial. If
participants respond ‘Yes’ they are asked a second question: ‘Was the C
facing forward (f) or backward (b)?’ (Colour figure online)
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aware they were of eye-movement errors. What stands out in
relation to the question at hand, however, is that participants
tended to erroneously report a large number of trials with
saccade errors as ‘good’. To quantify this tendency across
participants, we calculated classification accuracy scores (see
Fig. 3). Participants have reasonably good precision scores,
that is, around 90% of trials that they reported as not good
were indeed trials in which they made a saccadic error.
However, median recall is much lower (40%). This tells us
that participants are not sensitive to most of the saccadic errors
theymade during this experiment. Figure 3 shows these scores
separately for each target-distractor distance, and it is clear this
makes little difference to whether or not participants detect
having made an error.
Previous research has suggested that awareness of the onset
can either decrease or increase the incidence of capture, de-
pending on the age of the participants (Kramer, Hahn, Irwin,
& Theeuwes, 1999). Chisholm and Kingstone (2014) also
showed that explicitly telling participants to avoid capture
can lower the rate of capture. We therefore checked whether
or not awareness of errors was related to the rate of capture in
individual participants and found no systematic relationship
(see Fig. 4). Being aware of errors does not appear to lead
participants to make fewer of them, at least not in our study.
Previous research has also found a relationship between
dwell time on the erroneously fixated item and reported
awareness of the error (Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2012;
Mokler & Fischer, 1999). In Fig. 5, we show the dwell time
on the onset distractor on trials in which the error was correct-
ly reported (‘thought error’) and trials in which the participant
reported the eyemovement was good (‘thought direct’).While
Fig. 2 Number of trials in which direct or erroneous eyemovements were
executed by each participant are shown. Trials which participants
identified as good (‘yes’) or bad (‘no’) are presented in light and dark
blue, respectively, inside the data bars. Data include only trials on which a
sudden onset was presented. (Colour figure online)
Fig. 3 Classification accuracy scores in Experiment 1. Although
precision scores are relatively high, recall is low, indicating that many
eye-movement errors were not detected. The data are separated by target-
distractor distance. The box plots represent the median, first, and third
quartiles
Table 1 Number of trials and saccade latency for each category in
Experiment 1
Direct to target Fixated onset Other
Number of trials
Onset 406 658 232
No onset 812 – 484
Mean saccade latency (SD)
Onset 232 (104) 158 (102) 170 (126)
No onset 203 (109) – 126 (125)
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there is a great deal of overlap between the distributions, lon-
ger dwell times tend to occur on trials in which the error was
reported (see Fig. 5). A linear mixed-effects model with a
binomial transform showed dwell time, but not saccade laten-
cy, is a significant predictor of recall (p < .001), with longer
dwell times associated with higher recall.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, eye-movement errors occurred on a large
number of trials. The majority of these errors were classified
as ‘good’ trials by participants, consistent with the general
observation of Theeuwes et al. (1998) that participants are
unaware of their errors. Interestingly, even the two authors,
who were aware of the motivation for the experiment and the
phenomenon of oculomotor capture, were largely unaware of
their own eye-movement errors. Awareness of errors and fore-
knowledge about a tendency for eye-movement errors appears
not to reduce the incidence of these errors. Conversely, a ten-
dency to make more or fewer errors was not related to aware-
ness of these eye-movement errors.
Experiment 2: Attentional capture
In this experiment we explored the contribution of both dwell
time and a measure of attention to error awareness. If spatial
attention and eye movements are dissociable, as some previous
research has suggested (e.g. Hunt & Kingstone, 2003; Stelmach
et al., 1997; Van der Stigchel & De Vries, 2015), errors may go
unnoticed if the eyes, but not attention, are directed to the onset.
To test the role of attention in error awareness, we used a para-
digm similar to Experiment 1, but introduced a congruent/
incongruent C to the target and distractor, as used in Theeuwes
and Burger (1998). Participants were required to execute sac-
cades directly to a target singleton and report the orientation of
the C contained in the target. We expected participants to pro-
duce faster reaction times on trials with no onset distractor rela-
tive to trials with an onset distractor. On trials with a distractor,
we expected participants to also respond slower when the C
inside the distractor was incongruent with the target C relative
to when they were congruent. As in the previous study, we
should see longer dwell times when participants are aware of
their errors than when they are unaware, but with a large degree
Fig. 5 Dwell time on the distracter for trials where the participant reported the error (‘thought error’; light grey) and where they did not (‘thought direct’;
dark grey)
Fig. 4 There is no correlation between the tendency to report one’s own
errors and eye-movement accuracy
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of overlap. We examined the influence of both dwell time on the
distractor and reaction time to the target on eye-movement error
awareness, using distractor interference on reaction time as a
measure of the extent to which attention was allocated to the
distractor. Dwell time and attention may contribute independent-
ly to the likelihood of detecting an eye-movement error.
Alternatively, their contributions may overlap (e.g. dwell time
may increase both error awareness and congruency effects).
The hypotheses and planned analyses for this study were
preregistered on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/
an8gj/). In the preregistered report at this link, we report the
results of a pilot experiment on 16 participants which we ran
in order to verify that we would be able to observe congruency
effects in our paradigm, and to define, test, and refine the
analyses we would apply to the new set of data from 36
participants reported below, which we had not yet seen. The
Method and Results sections follow the preregistered plan.
Planned methods
Participants
Thirty naïve participants (25 females,Mage 20.8, range: 19–25
years) took part in the study. We additionally include data
from six undergraduate students who were nonnaïve (these
students also helped in data collection, and are labelled a–f
in Fig. 7).
Stimuli and procedure
The general stimuli and procedure were the same as those
used in Experiment 1, with two changes (see Fig. 6). First,
on distractor trials an additional C was presented within the
onset distractor. The C in the distractor also faced either for-
wards or backwards (randomly determined). Second, the order
of the questions presented at the end of each trial were
swapped, with participants identifying the direction of the C
presented within the target circle first, without being prompted
by an on-screen question. They were told to press the key
corresponding to the direction of the C (left arrow for back-
ward, right arrow for forward) as quickly as possible. If they
did not respond within 1,500 ms, the screen displayed the
message ‘too slow’, and the trial ended (and was recycled).
Following a successful response to the orientation within the
deadline, participants were then asked, via a question present-
ed on the screen, whether they had executed a ‘direct eye
movement’. In total, the experiment included 577 trials, with
half of trials not including a distractor. In distractor trials, theC
within the distractor was congruent with the discrimination
target C in the target circle on half of the trials.
Planned analysis
Analyses were primarily carried out using mixed-effect
models (lme4 1.1–13 library for R 3.4.0), and 95% confidence
Fig. 6 Example of an onset-present trial. Six orange circles are presented
in a circular array around a central fixation cross (first panel). After 1,000
ms, five circles change to red, and one remains orange (second panel). As
this is an onset-present trial, an additional red circle appears at the same
time as the colour change. The distractor circle contains a C. Participants
must saccade to the orange target and report the direction of the C inside
the orange target. Participants press the left arrow key for backward or the
right arrow key for forward. If they do not respond within 1,500 ms, the
screen will display the message ‘too slow’, and the trial ends. Once a
response is recorded, participants are then asked, ‘Did you make a direct
eye movement?’. Responding ‘yes’ means that the participant believed
their eyes went directly to the orange circle on that trial; responding ‘no’
means that they believed their eyes did not go directly to the orange circle
on that trial. (Colour figure online)
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intervals (CI) on parameter estimates were calculated via para-
metric bootstrapping using the confint function. All analysis
code will be publicly released with the data upon publica-
tion (https://osf.io/grbd9/). Following advice from Barr et al.
(2013), results are reported frommodels containing the largest
random effects structure that can be support by the data.
Modifications from the preregistered plan
This experiment was preregistered on the open science frame-
work (https://osf.io/an8gj/). Relative to our preregistered plan,
we made two modifications:
1. We reduced proportion of no-onset trials from 50% to one
third. A total of 432 trials were completed by all partici-
pants except participant a, who completed 648 trials.
2. To clarify what we were asking participants to report, we
changed the question about their eye movements from
asking whether the eye movement was ‘good’ to asking
whether the eye movement was ‘direct’. As can be seen
by comparing the results below with the preregistered
pilot data, this change did not have any substantial effect
on the reporting of eye-movement errors.
Results
Capture rate and error awareness
As in Experiment 1, data presented to illustrate awareness of
errors includes all error types (because participants were asked
to report whether their eye movement was ‘direct’, any devi-
ations from that are considered errors). The number of trials on
which eye movements are directed to the target, the onset and
to other locations are shown in Table 2, separately for trials
with onsets and no onsets. Saccade latency for each of these
conditions is also reported.
Figure 7 shows the number of trials with eye-movement er-
rors (using the same criteria as in Experiment 1) and trials with
accurate eye movements to the target for each participant. Within
each of these categories, the number of trials to which the partic-
ipant responded ‘yes’ (direct) or ‘no’ (error) is shown.
Classification accuracy scores are presented in Fig. 8. As in
Experiment 1, participants make a large number of eye-
movement errors. They have reasonably good precision scores,
demonstrating that when they think they made an error they are
usually correct. But median recall is low, demonstrating that
they are not aware of most of their errors. This finding closely
mirrors the results of Experiment 1, demonstrating the robust-
ness of this pattern despite several modifications to the proce-
dure (the inclusion of a speeded response to the C orientation,
the decreased proportion of no-onset trials, the delay in the
report of awareness, and the change in wording of the question).
Manual responses to discriminate the C orientation
For all the analyses of discrimination reaction time, we re-
moved incorrect trials and trials where the target was not fix-
ated, with 77% of the trials remaining. Accuracy to discrimi-
nate the C orientation was generally high, with mean accura-
cies above 89% in all three conditions. Similarly, the average
accuracy (over conditions) for each participant was generally
high, with all but two achieving an accuracy above 80% (me-
dian participant accuracy of 95%, minimum 69%). We veri-
fied that the binomial 95% CI around each participant’s accu-
racy was above 50%.
In Fig. 9, we present manual reaction time to verify that the
sudden onset distractor does slow manual responses, and to
further verify that distractorC orientation influences responses
to the target C, with incongruent orientations producing
slower responses than congruent orientations.
The presence of the congruency effect was confirmed with
a linear mixed-effects model (with maximal random effects
structure). As the distribution of response times is skewed,
we verify that the 95% CI for the congruency effect size does
not contain zero with log-transformed data, but presents the
results from the model with untransformed variables for ease
of interpretation. We find that reaction times for incongruent
trials are 25 ms slower than congruent trials, 95% CI [14 ms,
37 ms]. This is in line with previous findings (e.g. Theeuwes
1991; Theeuwes & Burger, 1998).
Dwell time
All further analysis is restricted to only those trials with a
correct manual response in which the participant fixated both
the onset distracter and the target, in that order. This amounted
to 3,897 trials (24.7% of all trials). The dwell time on the
distractor tended to be slightly longer for those trials on which
the errors were reported (see Fig. 10).
Predicting error awareness from dwell time and manual RT
We now investigate which factors influence whether partici-
pants notice they made an eye-movement error on trials where
Table 2 Number of trials and saccade latency for each category in
Experiment 2
Direct to target Fixated onset Other
Onset 4144 4158 2210
No onset 4391 – 865
Mean saccade latency (SD)
Onset 226 (126) 147 (158) 189 (197)
No onset 184 (82) – 165 (177)
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they fixated first the onset and then the target (24.7% of trials,
as above). Specifically, we ran a generalized linear mixed-
effects model with a binomial transform to see what influences
the likelihood of participants correctly responding that they
made an eye-movement error. As predictors, we include the
follow factors:
& Whether the trial was congruent or incongruent, coded as
a dummy (−1, 1) variable.
& td: Time spent fixating the distracter (dwell time).
& ta: Additional response time, defined as manual RT minus
dwell time.
We log transform and scale td and ta so that they have zero
mean and a standard deviation of one. Only a random inter-
cept was included in the model, as models containing random
slopes did not converge.
Congruent and incongruent trials are included in the cur-
rent model to examine whether errors are unnoticed if the
eyes, but not attention, are directed to the onset, suggesting
that covert attention and eye movements are dissociable. Both
dwell time on the distractor and additional response time are
also included based on the results of Experiment 1, which
demonstrated that participants display longer dwell times on
Fig. 7 Proportion of trials in which direct or erroneous eye movements were executed by each participant. Trials in which participants identified as
indirect (‘no’) or direct (‘yes’) are presented in dark and light, respectively
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Fig. 9 Violin plot depicting the variability of manual reaction time to
discriminate the C on individual trial data (curve of violins) as well as
variability of participant median RTs (points within each violin). For the
congruent and incongruent trials, only trials on which participants fixated
the distractor onset are included. Participants are slower when there is a
distracter onset present, and slower still when that onset contains a C that
is incongruent with the orientation of the target C
Fig. 8 Classification accuracy scores. Although precision scores are
relatively high, recall is lower with participants showing a large
variation in performance
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trials in which they are aware of their errors compared with
when they are unaware, but with a large degree of overlap.
The main conclusion from the results of this model is that
there was no evidence that congruency has an effect on wheth-
er participants notice that they incorrectly fixated the target.
The other factors and their interaction are significant: td beta =
.41, (SE = 0.047) and ta beta = .76 (SE = 0.048) with an
interaction between these (beta = −.10, SE = 0.044). This
shows that dwell time and additional response time influence
error awareness with these two factors showing an under-
additive interaction effect. This under-additive interaction
suggests a delay in the overall time to respond to the target
(which includes both dwell time and response delay) increase
awareness of the error, rather than both of these components
contributing to error awareness independently.
Are congruency effects still observed when participants are
unaware of the error?
Finally, we investigate whether the congruency effect is mod-
ulated by awareness, factoring out any effects of dwell time on
the distractor. Specifically, we test whether the effect of con-
gruency on ta (response time − dwell time)2 is modulated by
whether participants reported their error or not. As above, this
analysis was conducted only on trials where the participant
fixated the onset and then the distractor. If awareness of this
error is related to attention to the distractor, we should see
larger congruency effects on trials where participants are
aware of their error. We fit a linear mixed-effects model with
congruency and awareness (i.e. whether they reported the
error or not) as predictors, with random effects of awareness
and random intercepts over observers. The model finds that ta
is 39 ms (95% CI [24 ms, 51 ms]) slower for incongruent
trials. Note that this congruency effect of 39 ms is larger than
the response-time congruency effect established above (25
ms) in part because this analysis includes only those trials
where the eyes landed on the distractor before going to the
target. As we would expect given the logistic regression
above, ta is slower in trials in which the observers noticed that
they had made an error (by 103 ms, 95% CI [77 ms, 131 ms]).
However, there was no evidence that the congruency effect
was modulated by awareness, as the effect size was −4 ms,
which is close to zero, 95% CI [−26 ms, 16 ms]. This result
establishes that the size of the congruency effect is roughly
equivalent whether or not participants were aware of having
looked at the distractor.
Discussion
We aimed to address two key questions. First, to what extent
are observers able to detect the occurrence of large eye-
movement errors (Experiment 1)? While there is a relatively
large amount of variability across individuals, we find that the
majority of people are unable to report the majority of their
eye-movement errors. Nonetheless, when participants do re-
port having made an error, they are usually correct, suggesting
they are sensitive to the occurrence of some errors, but not
others. Following directly from this conclusion is our second
question: What determines whether an eye-movement error is
detected or missed (Experiment 2)? We specifically tested the
role of two factors: the duration of the fixation on the errone-
ously fixated object and how much attention was allocated to
that object, as measured by the size of the congruency effect.
2 There was one data point (out of 3,897) with a negative value for ta. This was
removed from the analysis. After removing this point, the smallest value for ta
was 128 ms.
Fig. 10 Histogram depicting the dwell time on the distractor onset on trials on which the participant fixated the onset and noticed it (‘thought error’; light
grey) versus not noticing it (‘thought direct’; dark grey)
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Fixation duration was associated with awareness of the error,
but there was no association between congruency effects and
eye-movement awareness.
We based our experiment on previous research from
Theeuwes (1991) and Theeuwes et al. (1998) and successfully
replicated both their attentional capture and oculomotor
capture effects, demonstrating that both attention and the
eyes were captured by the sudden onset on a substantial
proportion of trials. An interesting question that has yet to be
clearly addressed is whether or not these two phenomena of
attentional and oculomotor capture are one and the same, or if
attention and the eyes are both independently attracted to
sudden onsets. Hunt, von Mühlenen, et al. (2007) demonstrat-
ed that manual responses and saccades are captured by a sud-
den onset to a similar extent as long as they are matched in
terms of response time (i.e. if manual responses are performed
under extreme time pressure, to make them as fast as a typical
saccadic response). This suggests a central mechanism
operates across multiple effectors to drive responses towards
the onset. On the other hand, it is not yet clear that this central
mechanism is attention. If shifts of attention cause capture of
the eyes and other response systems, it should not be possible
to observe oculomotor capture in the absence of attentional
capture. If we had observed congruency effects in Experiment
2 that were reduced or absent on trials where participants were
unaware that they made an eye movement to the distractor,
then this would have been clear evidence that attentional and
oculomotor capture are dissociable phenomena, and by exten-
sion, that attention and eye movements are dissociable as well.
However, we found that congruency effects are of a similar
size, whether or not participants are aware that they looked at
the distractor. This result does not rule out the possibility that
attention and oculomotor capture are dissociable phenomena,
but it is consistent with the generally well-accepted assertion
that eye movements and attention tend to shift together, and
provides support for the notion that a common priority map
drives both attentional and eye-movement selection (e.g.
Bisley & Goldberg, 2010).
Theeuwes et al. (1998) reported that participants were un-
aware that their eyes were captured by the onset, while
Belopolsky et al. (2008) found that participants could report
about two thirds of their capture errors. In our experiment,
participants were able to accurately report about 25% of their
eye-movement errors, and this average was relatively consis-
tent across the two experiments, despite several substantial
differences between the experiments, including the addition
of the speeded manual response and the wording of the ques-
tion about the error (i.e. whether it was a ‘good’ or a ‘direct’
eye movement). There was a wide variation of results across
individuals in our sample, however, which could account for
some of the disparity with previous findings. The existence of
this individual variation reinforces the importance of
obtaining relatively large samples and conveying variability
in as much detail as possible when reporting and illustrating
results, as we have done here. We can conclude from our
results that most of our participants are capable of accurately
reporting at least some of their eye-movement errors. This
could be taken as evidence that we have direct awareness of
our own eye movements, at least some of the time. However,
as we argued in our previous study (Clarke et al., 2017), there
are many alternative strategies available to participants that
can lead to above-chance performance at reporting on their
own eye movements. For example, in our previous study,
we showed that participants use their memory of the existence
of specific objects in a scene to indirectly infer which objects
they fixated. Although the distractor objects in the current
study were all circles of the same size and colour, the unique
onset was a salient signal, and participants could still indirect-
ly infer that they looked at the onset on the trial on which they
remember it having occurred. Consistent with this interpreta-
tion, having looked at the onset distractor for a longer duration
was associated with being able to report the eye-movement
error (see also Belopolsky et al., 2008; Mokler & Fisher,
1999). However, the direction of the relationship between fix-
ation duration and awareness remains to be determined: That
is, do participants look at the object for a longer period of time
because they are consciously aware of it? Or are they aware of
the object because they looked at it for a longer period of time?
Our fixation durations varied widely (see Figs. 5 and 10), and
this is not an exceptional finding; most studies show a similar
degree of variation. A recent paper explored the temporal
dynamics of saccade execution and could detect no overarch-
ing rhythmicity, and concluded a self-paced mechanism
constrained by a postsaccade refractory period could best ex-
plain variations in fixation durations during periods of free
viewing (Amit, Abeles, Bar-Gad, & Yuval-Greenberg,
2017). In their model, a period of inhibition followed each
saccade, sampled from a Gaussian distribution, and was
followed by a ‘rebound’ period of elevated saccade probabil-
ity. We have shown that the fixations on the upper end of the
distribution of fixation durations are more likely to be report-
ed, but there is still a great deal of overlap between the dura-
tion distributions of aware and unaware trials left to explain.
When we isolated only those trials where the eyes went to
the onset distractor first and then to the colour singleton target,
we observed slower responses to report the orientation of the
C inside the colour singleton when the C inside the onset
distractor was incongruent relative to congruent. It is impor-
tant to note that although the congruency effect was relatively
small, we preregistered the experiment on the Open Science
Framework, and the planned analysis we conducted was based
on a separate set of pilot data from 16 participants (the data
from the pilot can be viewed in full in the preregistered doc-
ument here: https://osf.io/an8gj). This pilot study’s pattern of
results was very close to the current results, with small but
significant congruency effects. However, awareness did not
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mediate the magnitude of the congruency effect. While this is
a null result, we observed no hint of an effect across both our
pilot experiment (N = 16) and the current experiment (N = 36),
suggesting it is unlikely to be due to a lack of power.
We are assuming that the congruency effect is due to atten-
tion allocated to the onset distractor because this is how it has
been interpreted in previous research (Theeweus & Burger,
1998). We did not measure the effect of letter distractors at
locations other than the onset, however. It is possible a diffuse
attention to the display as a whole, as opposed to only the
target and the onset, could have produced an interference ef-
fect when the two Cs in the display were incongruent.
Although the received view is that attention would be required
for discriminating the C (e.g. Lachter, Forster, & Ruthruff,
2004) there is also some debate around the stage of processing
at which interference between two stimuli can occur (e.g.
Egner, 2008), including perceptual or response stages. It is
therefore possible that a different measure of attention may
produce a different pattern of results in terms of its relationship
to awareness of the error. Seemingly consistent with this pos-
sibility, Belopolsky and Theeuwes (2012) found a slightly
larger N1 for onsets when participants were aware of having
made the errors. However, like in our study, fixation durations
on the onset were also longer when participants were aware of
the error, and N1 amplitudes were correlated with fixation
duration, making this relationship difficult to interpret.
Future research could, for example, measure the N1 on trials
equated for dwell time, given the large amount of overlap in
these distributions.
Several theories and models have suggested that attention
and awareness are dissociable (e.g. Block, 2007, 2011; Cohen
& Dennett, 2011; Koch, 2004; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007;
Kentridge & Heywood, 2001; Koivisto, Kainulainen, &
Revonsuo, 2009; Lamme, 2003, 2010; Tononi & Koch,
2008). A broad range of experimental paradigms have dem-
onstrated the existence of attention-related effects in the ab-
sence of awareness, including visual masking (e.g. Kiefer &
Martens, 2010; Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002; Shin,
Stolte, & Chong, 2009), crowding (e.g. Faivre & Kouider,
2011; Montaser-Kouhsari & Rajimehr, 2005), continuous
flash suppression (e.g. Hsieh, Colas, & Kanwisher, 2011;
Jiang & He, 2006;) and sub-threshold presentations (e.g.
Bauer, Cheadle, Parton, Müller, & Usher, 2009). While the
above research makes a clear case that attention can be allo-
cated without awareness, claims of awareness without atten-
tion are more controversial (e.g. Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; Li,
VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002; Mack & Rock, 1998).
Cohen, Cavanagh, Chun, and Nakayama (2012) argue against
such a ‘double-dissociation’, instead proposing that attention
is necessary, but not sufficient, for awareness. They suggest
that awareness will follow if a requisite amount of attention is
allocated to an object. If this account is correct, it is puzzling
that variations in reported awareness in our experiment were
not associated with variations in our measure of attention. If
more attention increases the likelihood that a stimulus or event
will be consciously perceived, one would expect larger atten-
tional effects to be associated with reported, as opposed to
unreported, events. While we find no evidence that this is
the case, both our measure of attention and our self-report
method of determining awareness may be influenced in dif-
ferent ways by random trial-by-trial fluctuations in alertness or
motor readiness in such a way as to mask their relationship.
Our results, in showing that modulations in awareness are not
accompanied by changes in measurable allocation of atten-
tion, are therefore an intriguing piece of evidence that aware-
ness does not depend on attention, but further research estab-
lishing a similar pattern would be a welcome development for
better understanding the relationship between awareness and
attention.
Conclusion
Participants looked at a sudden-onset distractor on a large
proportion of trials, and they were unaware of the majority
of these eye movement errors. Longer fixations on the
distractor were associated with a modestly elevated probabil-
ity that the error would be reported, but there is a great deal of
overlap between the distributions of reported and unreported
error fixation durations that remains unexplained. Our mea-
sure of attention allocation to the distractor showed no differ-
ence between reported and unreported errors. The results sug-
gest attention effects do not depend on awareness, and leave
open the question of what determines whether an eye move-
ment error will be detected or not.
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